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INTRODUCTION
In the recent case of Schwegmann Bank and Trust Co. of Jefferson
v. Simmons,' the United States Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals was faced
with having to articulate the proper tests for the requirements of "good
faith" and "without notice of a claim or defense" for holder in due
course status.
2
In Schwegmann, the defendant, Dr. Simmons, had executed a prom-
issory note as part of an investment in a limited partnership. After
being transferred several times, the note was eventually pledged as se-
curity for a loan agreement in which Schwegmann Bank was a partic-
ipating bank. Dr. Simmons, the maker of the note, made payments to
Schwegmann Bank for some time, but eventually defaulted on the note.
The bank sought to enforce the note, claiming it was a holder in due
course and was therefore not subject to defenses the maker might have
against the note. The trial court found in favor of Schwegmann Bank,
concluding that the bank was a holder in due course.
On appeal, the court of appeal upheld the trial court's decision,
focusing primarily on the issue of good faith; in particular, whether the
proper test for the good faith requirement should be an objective or
subjective standard. By relying on prior case law, which had failed to
adequately distinguish between the requirements of good faith and notice,
the court seemed to blur these two requirements and formulated a test
that provides little guidance for lower courts. The court applied a
subjective test for both the "good faith" and "without notice" re-
quirements, stating that a more subjective inquiry must be performed
in determining holder in due course status.
While the outcome of the case may have been correct in terms of
which party prevailed,3 the reasoning expressed by the court with regard
Copyright 1990, by LOUISIANA LAW REviEw.
1. 880 F.2d 838 (5th Cir. 1989).
2. La. R.S. 10:3-302 (1983) and U.C.C. § 3-302 (1987).
3. Simmons claimed failure of consideration, federal securities law violations, and
fraud. He contended that Schwegmann Bank could not be in good faith and had notice
of these defenses because the bank was aware that the real estate scheme was an investment
risk and that Schwegmann had evidence that Q-L or Quinn-L was in poor financial
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to the notice requirement accomplishes little to clear up the confusion
over good faith and notice. Furthermore, because the Louisiana Supreme
Court has yet to directly address this topic, the Schwegmann decision
is of particular importance; it will no doubt be looked to by lower
courts in Louisiana as authority on the U.C.C.'s requirements for holder
in due course status.4
This paper will focus on the Fifth Circuit's failure to adequately
address the requirement of "without notice" for holders in due course,
and will attempt to clarify what the drafters of the U.C.C. meant by
"without notice" of a claim or defense.' First, a look at the background
of the statutes and their treatment in other jurisdictions is necessary
because Louisiana's version of the U.C.C. is similar to versions in other
jurisdictions, as was Louisiana's version of the old Negotiable Instru-
ments Law (N.I.L.). 6 The Schwegmann decision and recent Louisiana
jurisprudence will be analyzed to highlight the area of confusion that
has arisen in regard to the tests that should be used for determining
"good faith" and "without notice" of a claim or defense. Finally, a
more appropriate test for interpreting the requirement of "notice" will
be suggested.
STATUTORY BACKGROUND
Attaining the status of a holder of commercial paper in due course
is desirable in that such status shields the holder from any claims of
ownership, and most defenses, that the maker and third parties might
have against the instrument. Examples of such defenses are failure of
consideration or failure of the transferor to fulfill an underlying obli-
gation. 7 In order to be a holder in due course, a holder8 of a negotiable
condition. These facts would hardly constitute "notice" of these defenses under any
standard, therefore the outcome of the case was properly decided. However, the court's
failure to treat "notice" as a separate issue, while affirming a summary judgment, calls
into question the validity of the court's approach.
4. As a federal court sitting in diversity, the Schwegmann court was bound to apply
Louisiana law. Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 58 S. Ct. 817 (1938).
5. La. R.S. 10:3-302 (1983) and U.C.C. § 3-302 (1987). This note is not concerned
with distinctions between constructive and actual notice, or the definition of "notice" in
other parts of the U.C.C. For a thorough discussion of these topics, see Blum, Notice
to Holders in Due Course and Other Bona Fide Purchasers Under the Uniform Commercial
Code, 22 B.C.L. Rev. 203 (1981).
6. Louisiana's version of the N.I.L. was found in Title 7 of the Louisiana Revised
Statutes.
7. La. R.S. 10:3-305 (1983) and U.C.C. § 3-305 (1987).
8. La. R.S. 10:1-201(20) (1983) and U.C.C. 1-201(20) (1987): "Holder" means a
person who is in possession of a document of title or an instrument or certificated
investment security drawn, issued, or indorsed to him or his order or to bearer or in
blank.
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instrument must satisfy three conditions: (1) the holder must have taken
the instrument for value, (2) he must have taken the instrument in good
faith, and (3) he must have taken the instrument without notice that it
is overdue or has been dishonored, or of any defense or claim to it on
the part of any person.9
The first requirement, the requirement that the holder take the
instrument "for value," generally has not given courts many problems
in application. 0 The second and third requirements, those of "good
faith" and "without notice of a claim or defense," have been described
as "first cousins"" of one another and have caused some difficulty in
application and interpretation. Problems have arisen as to the proper
standard by which these two criteria should be measured, subjective or
objective. Oftentimes courts have unwittingly merged the two into a
single requirement, overlooking the importance of keeping them separate.
In contrast to the former uniform law in the area of commercial
paper, the Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law (N.I.L.), 2 the U.C.C.
is structured to make it clear that good faith and without notice are
two distinct criteria. 3 The N.I.L. did not define "good faith," and the
definition of "notice" was based on the holder's actual knowledge of
claims or defenses, or knowledge of certain facts that would indicate
he took the instrument in "bad faith.' ' 4 Perhaps because the notice
inquiry could be satisfied under the N.I.L. by a finding that the holder
took the instrument under circumstances that indicated bad faith on his
part, the concepts of good faith and notice were merged into one inquiry,
thus resulting in a single standard being applied to both inquiries.
Under the U.C.C., good faith is defined as honesty in fact, a
definition that leaves little question that a subjective inquiry was intended
by the drafters." On the other hand, "without notice of a claim or
defense" is defined under the U.C.C. as follows:
A person has notice of a fact when: (a) he has actual knowledge
of it; or (b) he has received a notice or notification of it; or
9. La. R.S. 10:3-302 (1983) and U.C.C. § 3-302 (1987).
10. La. R.S. 10:3-303 (1983) and U.C.C. § 3-303 (1987).
11. J. White and R. Summers, Uniform Commercial Code, § 14-6, at 627 (3d ed.
1988).
12. See supra note 6.
13. McDonnell, Freedom From Claims and Defenses: A Study in Judicial Activism
Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 17 Ga. L. Rev. 569, 600 (1983).
14. N.I.L. § 56:
To constitute notice of an infirmity in the instrument or defect in the title of
the person negotiating the same, the person to whom it is negotiated must have
had actual knowledge of the infirmity or defect, or knowledge of such facts
that his action in taking the instrument amounted to "bad faith."
15. La. R.S. 10:1-201(19) (1983) and U.C.C. § 1-201(19); see also McDonnell, supra
note 13, at 601.
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(c) from all the facts and circumstances known to him at the
time in question he has reason to know that it exists.16
Particular instances of "notice" of a claim or defense are also
outlined under the U.C.C. 17 A party can acquire notice of a claim or
defense by observing that the instrument has been altered, that payment
is overdue, that the instrument has been marked paid, or otherwise
acquires notice of a contractual defense of the maker.I" The last method
requires an interpretation of the definition of "notice."
16. U.C.C. § 1-201(25) (1987).
17. La. R.S. 10:3-304 (1983). The statute defines notice to the purchaser as follows:
(1) The purchaser has notice of a claim or defense if
(a) the instrument is so incomplete, bears such visible evidence of forgery
or alteration, or is otherwise so irregular as to call into question its
validity, terms or ownership or to create an ambiguity as to the party
to pay; or
(b) the purchaser has notice that the obligation of any party is voidable in
whole or in part, or that all parties have been discharged.
(2) The purchaser has notice of a claim against the instrument when he has
knowledge that a fiduciary has negotiated the instrument in payment of or
as security for his own debt or in any transaction for his own benefit or
otherwise in breach of duty.
(3) The purchaser has notice that an instrument is overdue if he has reason to
know
(a) that any part of the principal amount is overdue or that there is an
uncured default in payment of another instrument of the same series;
or
(b) that acceleration of the instrument has been made; or
(c) that he is taking a demand instrument after demand has been made or
more than a reasonable length of time after its issue. A reasonable time
for a check drawn and payable within the states and territories of the
United States and the District of Columbia is presumed to be thirty
days.
(4) Knowledge of the following facts does not of itself give the purchaser notice
of a defense or claim
(a) that the instrument is antedated or postdated;
(b) that it was issued or negotiated in return for an executory promise or
accompanied by a separate agreement, unless the purchaser has notice
that a defense or claim has arisen from the terms thereof;
(c) that any party has signed for accommodation;
(d) that an incomplete instrument has been completed, unless the purchaser
has notice of any improper completion;
(e) that any person negotiating the instrument is or was a fiduciary;
(f) that there has been default in payment of interest on the instrument or
in payment of any other instrument, except one of the same series.
(5) The filing or recording of a document does not of itself constitute notice
within the provisions of this Chapter to a person who would otherwise be
a holder in due course.
(6) To be effective notice must be received at such time and in such manner
as to give a reasonable opportunity to act on it.
18. Id.: see also J. White and R. Summers, supra note 10, at 627.
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According to the U.C.C. definition, a person has notice, even though
he may not have "actual knowledge" of a claim or defense, if he has
''reason to know" that a claim or defense exists.' 9 The official comments
to the U.C.C. indicate that the "reason to know" portion of the
definition of notice is intended to bring a degree of objectivity to the
concept of "lack of notice." 2 The comments define a "reason to know"
as:
[Ilntended to exclude mere suspicion, as distinguished from def-
inite information .... It is also intended to make clear that the
test is an objective one, and that the holder's testimony that
he did not know is not conclusive. 21
The premise that the drafters intended "without notice" to be some-
thing more than a totally subjective inquiry is further bolstered by the
fact that the legislature of New York, a state where the bankers' lobby
is quite formidable, had hotly debated the issues of good faith and
notice prior to adopting the U.C.C.2 2 The objective concept embodied
in the notice provision of the original U.C.C. was thought to impede
negotiability by subjecting would-be holders in due course to the overly
broad hindsight of triers of fact. 23 Eventually, New York modified
Section 3-304 so that the element of "knowledge which amounts to bad
faith" found under the N.I.L. was retained in the New York statute.2A
In light of this background, it is understandable that courts often
merge the "without notice" and the "good faith" requirements. The
same facts and circumstances that must be examined in order to de-
termine good faith must also be looked at to determine notice. Addi-
tionally, the more objective requirement of notice contains a sub-part
that is subjective-one must first determine what facts and circumstances
were known to the would-be holder in due course at the time of
purchase. 21 However, it'is clear that once this threshold subjective inquiry
is answered, a further analysis is required in order to determine if the
"without notice" requirement has been fulfilled. What a person did not
19. U.C.C. § 1-201(25)(c) (1987).
20. U.C.C. § 3-304, Notes and Comments to Tent. Draft No. 3, § 46 (1949): "Reason
to know. This is intended to exclude mere suspicion, as distinguished from definite
information... It is also intended to make clear that the test is an objective one, and
that the holder's testimony that he did not know is not conclusive."
21. Id.
22. See McDonnell, supra note 13, at 601 n.121.
23. See Chemical Bank of Rochester v. Haskell, 51 N.Y.2d 85, 93, 432 N.Y.S.2d
478, 481, 411 N.E.2d 1339, 1342 (1980).
24. N.Y. U.C.C. Law § 3-304(7) (McKinney 1964). Virginia also has this provision;
Va. Code Ann. § 8.3-304(7) (1965).
25. W. Hawkland and L. Lawrence, 4 U.C.C. Series § 3-304:5, at 420 (Art. 3)
(1984).
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know may allow him to clear the hurdle of good faith, but that same
lack of actual knowledge will not automatically satisfy the notice re-
quirement.
The drafters of the U.C.C. disentangled the issues of good faith
and notice in an attempt to make it clear that two distinct elements
must be proven by one claiming to be a holder in due course. Under
the N.I.L., tying the element of notice to the concept of "bad faith"
proved troublesome to many courts. 26 However, under the U.C.C., in-
terpretations of the issue of "notice" have proven to be anything but
uniform among the various jurisdictions. Even accepting the contention
that the issue of notice is intended to be subject to a different inquiry
than that of good faith, the difficult question arises as to what burden
should be imposed on a purchaser of negotiable paper seeking holder
in due course status.
The following sections will deal with an analysis of the various
approaches taken by the courts in interpreting, and in many cases
misinterpreting, the U.C.C. provisions on good faith and notice.
TREATMENT IN OTHER JURISDICTIONS
There appear to be the two primary lines of thought as to what
duties are to be placed on a purchaser in regard to the issue of notice. 27
The first is known as the "inferable knowledge" or "reasonable infer-
ence" test. 2 This test is based on a determination that, judging from
all the facts and circumstances known to the purchaser at the time of
purchase, the purchaser could or could not have reasonably inferred
that a claim or defense to the instrument exists. 29
The case often cited as representing a classic "inferable knowledge"
approach is Eldon's Super Fresh Stores, Inc. v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce,
Fenner & Smith, Inc.30 In this case the plaintiff had written a check
and delivered to its agent, with instructions that the agent was to use
the check to pay a debt owed by the plaintiff. Instead of using the
check as instructed, the agent gave the check to the payee in satisfaction
of the agent's personal debt.
In finding that the payee had become a holder in due course, the
court determined that the test to be used is one in which the trier of
26. See supra note 20.
27. See W. Hawkland and L. Lawrence, supra note 25, at 418.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. 296 Minn. 130, 207 N.W.2d 282 (1973); see also St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins.
Co. v. State of Salem, 412 N.E.2d 103 (Ind. App. 1st Dist. 1980) (knowledge that holder
almost bankrupt not notice when he is cashing a large check); Wohlrabe v. Pownell, 307
N.W.2d 478 (Minn. 1981) (knowledge that transferor is a known embezzler held not to
be notice).
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fact looks to see if the holder of the instrument had knowledge of facts
from which he should have inferred the claim or defense in question.
The court went on to state that
having notice by way of the "inferable knowledge" test is some-
thing more than failure to make inquiry about an unknown
fact. Failure to make such inquiry may be negligence and lack
of diligence, but it is not notice of what he might discover.3"
Under this standard, the court looked at the facts known to the
defendant at the time he took possession of the instrument and deter-
mined that he could not have inferred from these facts that a claim or
defense to the instrument existed.
The other approach to the issue of notice has been called the "duty
of inquiry" test.12 Under this standard, a purchaser has notice of a
claim or defense if, at the time he purchased the instrument, the facts
and circumstances known to him would lead a reasonable man to inquire
further, and the purchaser failed to make such inquiry.33
A case that represents the "duty to inquire" approach is E. Bierhaus
& Sons, Inc. v. Bowling.34 This case involved a suit by the holder of
a check that had been dishonored by the drawee bank. The holder
brought an action against the maker of the check claiming holder in
due course status. A third party had, without authorization, filled in
the blank portions of the check and presented it to the holder as payee.
The court found for the maker, stating that the holder was not a holder
in due course because he had received dishonored third-party checks
from that same person in the past and should have questioned of the
maker as to the third party's authority. The court reasoned that
where matters are known to a holder or are brought to his
attention which would put a reasonably prudent man on inquiry,
such inquiry must be made at the peril of being deprived of
holder in due course status."
Using this standard, the court determined that the defendant should
have inquired further into the circumstances surrounding the transaction
to determine if a claim or defense to the instrument existed.
Although these two approaches would often lead to the same result,
some commentators are of the opinion that disqualifying a would-be
31. 296 Minn. at 138, 207 N.W.2d at 288.
32. See W. Hawkland and L. Lawrence, supra note 25, at 419.
33. Id.
34. 486 N.E.2d 598 (Ind. App. 1st Dist. 1985); see also Farmers and Merchants State
Bank v. Western Bank, 841 F.2d 1433 (9th Cir. 1987) (bank had notice of a check kiting
scheme when it suspected the scheme but postponed investigation until after the loss was
shifted to the payor bank).
35. 486 N.E.2d at 604, 605.
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holder in due course for failing to inquire as to the propriety of the
instrument would place too great a burden on purchasers of negotiable
instruments and would detrimentally affect negotiability.3 6 On the other
hand, stating that an objective test is to be applied, without imposing
some commercially reasonable duty to inquire might undermine the intent
of the drafters of the U.C.C. to make good faith and notice separate
criteria.3 7
An alternative to the above mentioned approaches is that taken in
Kaw Valley State Bank and Trust Co. v. Riddle.3" In this case, a seller
of machinery had discounted a note to the plaintiff, Kaw Valley Bank.
The maker of the note, Riddle, was a prospective purchaser of equipment
but had never received any consideration for the note. The maker and
the transferror of the note made an agreement prior to the transfer of
the note that the note would be destroyed and a new one, based on
different consideration, would be substituted in its place. The maker
had no knowledge of the transfer of the note until the transferor was
placed in receivership, and no demand for payment was made on the
maker until suit was filed.
In its analysis, the court first recognized the distinctions between
good faith and notice, and then fashioned a compromise between the
reasonable inference and duty of inquiry approaches, establishing a
standard based on commercial reasonableness. The court looked to see
what facts and circumstances were known to the bank at the time of
the transaction, and then examined these facts and circumstances in
light of "commercial reasonableness" to see what the bank should have
known in regard to the issue of notice. Applying this standard, the
court found that it was reasonable to conclude that the holder had
notice of a claim or defense, precluding holder in due course status.
This standard, however, has not been the standard applied in Louis-
iana.
TREATMENT IN LOUISIANA COURTS
Many of the Louisiana courts that have dealt with the issue of the
proper standard to apply have stumbled over many of the same obstacles
that befell the Schwegmann court, namely, they have merged the concepts
of good faith and notice and have used imprecise language in articulating
their conclusions.
36. See W. Hawkland and L. Lawrence, supra note 25, at 421; see also McDonnell,
supra note 13, at 604.
37. One should keep in mind that an inquiry into whether or not a purchaser had
"notice" of a claim or defense is really only relevant when in fact there is a valid claim
or defense.
38. 219 Kan. 550, 549 P.2d 927 (1976).
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One of the cases cited in Schwegmann, Asian International, Ltd.
v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner and Smith, Inc.,19 confused the two
requirements when it declared that good faith is to be determined by
a "reasonableness" standard. In this case, the payee of a check brought
suit against the holder, alleging that the agents who had endorsed the
check had no authority to do so. The payee further alleged that he had
received no consideration for the transfer. The appellate court concluded
that the defendant was a holder in due course, but in doing so used
an incorrect standard when it stated that "reasonableness" was the test
to be used in deciding the issue of good faith. The Asian International
court borrowed this test from an earlier decision, Commercial National
Bank in Shreveport v. Calk,40 a case decided under the N.I.L., which
used a reasonableness standard to analyze the issue of notice. Under
the N.I.L., determining what constituted notice required a more sub-
jective "bad faith" inquiry.41 This questionable interpretation, and the
Asian International court's reliance on it, led to misinterpretation of
the U.C.C.
Interestingly, the same circuit had taken a different position on the
issues of good faith and notice only one year prior to Asian International
in the case of Republic of Texas Savings Association v. First Republic
Life Ins. Co.42 In Republic of Texas, the first circuit, recognizing that
there was a dearth of Louisiana jurisprudence interpreting the U.C.C.,
declared that the "reasonable man test" was not to be used in examining
the requirements of good faith or notice and stated that both inquiries
require "a more subjective test." ' 43 The court drew its authority for this
statement from a New York federal district court case that had applied
New York commercial law. 44 As mentioned earlier, New York is one
of only two states that equates "notice" of a claim or defense to "bad
faith" on the part of the holder. Accordingly, the New York court
centered its discussion 'around what constituted "bad faith," and con-
cluded that bad faith may be defined as "nothing less than guilty
knowledge or willful ignorance," a purely subjective standard.45 This
"willful ignorance" standard was adopted by the first circuit and er-
39. 435 So. 2d 1058 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1983).
40. Commercial Nat'l Bank in Shreveport v. Calk, 207 So. 2d 578 (La. App. 3d
Cir. 1968).
41. N.I.L. § 56; see also Rightmire, The Doctrine of Bad Faith in the Law of
Negotiable Instruments, 18 Mich. L. Rev. 355, 376 (1920).
42. 417 So. 2d 1251 (La. App. 1st Cir.), writ denied, 422 So. 2d 161 (1982).
43. Id. at 1255.
44. Corporacion Venezolana De Fomento v. Vintero Sales Corp., 452 F. Supp. 1108
(S.D.N.Y. 1978).
45. Id. at 1119, citing Manufacturers & Traders Trust Co. v. Sapowitch, 296 N.Y.
226, 72 N.E.2d 166 (1947).
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roneously applied to the "notice" requirement under Louisiana's U.C.C.
in Republic of Texas.
Other Louisiana decisions have picked up on the language of these
two previous cases in analyzing holder in due course issues. In the recent
case of Thompson v. H & S Packing Co., Inc.,46 the first circuit relied
on Asian International as controlling authority as to whether or not a
party has fulfilled all of the requirements for holder in due course status,
thus perpetuating the suspect "reasonableness" approach. In Thompson,
a corporation had executed a promissory note in order to repurchase
stock from one of its shareholders. The note was subsequently endorsed
to the plaintiff as security for a loan. The corporation refused to make
payments on the note, claiming it had a prior agreement with the original
payee by which the original payee agreed to accept a discounted amount
as full payment on the note. In finding that the transferee was a holder
in due course, and, therefore, not subject to any defenses of the cor-
poration, the court stated that "good faith is determined on a reason-
ableness standard, in that the facts must be such as would necessarily
put a reasonable person on inquiry to ascertain the true facts. 47
In Arthur Dooley & Son of Louisiana, Inc. v. Johnson,48 the fifth
circuit adopted almost verbatim the rationale used by the court in
Republic of Texas. In Arthur Dooley, a corporation sued the depositary
bank of one of its subcontractors, alleging that the bank had negligently
accepted unauthorized checks of the corporation and was, therefore, not
a holder in due course. The corporation had discovered that the sub-
contracting company was secretly operated by one of the corporation's
own employees as part of a scheme to embezzle money. The corporation
sued the bank for cashing the checks made out to the subcontractor,
claiming that the bank should have required the employee to personally
endorse the checks. Finding that the checks on their face met all re-
quirements of negotiability, the court then considered whether the bank
was in good faith or had notice of defenses. The court cited Republic
of Texas as controlling and determined that the depositary bank was a
holder in due course of the checks because the bank's knowledge did
not amount to notice of a claim or defense under the willful ignorance
standard .9
Equating bad faith with notice as the Republic of Texas and Arthur
Dooley courts did was clearly something the drafters of the U.C.C.
intended to avoid when they redefined notice and omitted the "bad
faith" language used by the N.I.L.5 0 Likewise, merging good faith and
46, 540 So. 2d 371 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1989).
47. Id. at 375.
48. 422 So. 2d 1270 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1982), writ denied, 429 So. 2d 152 (1983).
49. Id. at 1274, 1275.
50. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
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notice by evaluating both elements in light of a reasonableness standard,
as did the Asian International and Thompson courts, is an incorrect
approach. With this backdrop, the case of Schwegmann was appealed
to the United States Fifth Circuit in search of the proper standard to
apply for notice.
SCHWEGMANN
To restate the salient facts in Schwegmann, the defendant, Dr.
Simmons, had executed a promissory note as part of an investment in
a limited partnership. After several transfers, the note was eventually
pledged as security for a loan in which Schwegmann Bank was a par-
ticipating bank. After Dr. Simmons defaulted on the note, the bank
brought suit, claiming it was a holder in due course and was therefore
not subject to any defenses Dr. Simmons might have against the note.,'
Dr. Simmons alleged that Schwegmann was not a holder in due
course because the bank had not taken the instrument in good faith
and without notice of possible defenses to the instrument.5 2 The court
rejected Dr. Simmons' position and found the bank to be a holder in
due course.
In reaching its conclusion, however, the Schwegmann court erred
in failing to recognize the distinctions between good faith and notice
when it superimposed the subjective requirement of good faith onto the
lack of notice analysis. Prefacing its discussion, the court stated that
cases from other jurisdictions would be persuasive because Louisiana's
version of U.C.C. Article 3 is basically the same as that of other states. 53
The court looked to Louisiana cases and concluded that there was
conflicting authority as to whether good faith and notice should be
determined on the basis of a subjective or objective inquiry. The plaintiff,
Schwegmann Bank, relied on Republic of Texas Savings Association54
and Arthur Dooley" to support its position that good faith and notice
were essentially subjective standards. Dr. Simmons cited Asian Inter-
national,56 which held that good faith and notice are to be determined
on a reasonableness standard. As explained earlier, both positions appear
to be incorrect under the U.C.C. The U.S. Fifth Circuit recognized that
good faith should be determined by a subjective inquiry. Thus, the Asian
51. Bank of Commerce of Shreveport (BOC) had exceeded its lending limits and
sought out Schwegmann as a participant in order to placate the Federal Reserve.
52. Supra note 3.
53. Louisiana did make minor modifications to the wording of § 3-305, dealing with
the "real" defenses to which even a holder in due course is subject. Compare U.C.C. §
3-305 (1987) with La. R.S. 10:3-305 (1983).
54. 417 So. 2d 1251 (La. App. 1st Cir.), writ denied, 422 So. 2d 161 (1982).
55. 422 So. 2d 1270 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1982), writ denied, 429 So. 2d 152 (1983).
56. 435 So. 2d 1058 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1983).
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International court's clearly erroneous conclusion that the good faith
issue is subject to an objective standard no doubt weakened, in the eyes
of the Schwegmann court, the validity of the treatment of "lack of
notice" as an objective standard in Asian International.
Ironically, the Schwegmann court pointed out that good faith and
notice were treated differently under the U.C.C. than under the N.I.L., 7
yet the court eventually ignored the distinction between the two re-
quirements in its own analysis. The court resolved this conflict by
rejecting the reasonableness approach and adhering to the prior United
States Fifth Circuit decision of Bricks Unlimited, Inc. v. Agee,"8 which
had also applied essentially a subjective test to the issues of good faith
and notice.5 9
The Fifth Circuit's reliance on the Bricks Unlimited decision may
have been misguided, however, because that case had focused primarily
on the issue of good faith. Referring to General Investment Corp. v.
Angelini,60 a New Jersey case, the Bricks Unlimited court correctly stated
that good faith was a subjective requirement and that there was no duty
to inquire into the propriety of the instrument unless the circumstances
indicated a "deliberate desire" on the part of the holder to evade
knowledge. 61 The Bricks Unlimited court, like the court in Schwegmann,
allowed the issue of notice to be subsumed by the issue of good faith
and failed to adequately address the notice requirement. These conclu-
sions were based on the policy grounds that imposing these "duties of
inquiry" would create intolerable burdens on modern business. 62
The Schwegmann court used this language to dispose of the good
faith issue, finding Schwegmann Bank to be in good faith, but went
further with the "deliberate desire" concept, applying essentially the
same rationale to the issue of notice as it had to the issue of good
faith. The Schwegmann court looked favorably upon the policy reasons
enunciated in Bricks Unlimited and made short work of the notice
requirement, giving it only a parenthetical comment stating that the
words "reason to know," found in the definition of notice, guarded
against "willful ignorance.''63 The same standard was subsequently used
by the Schwegmann court in its discussion of notice when it cited
Republic of Texas. 4 The court then affirmed the decision of the lower
court granting holder in due course status to Schwegmann Bank.
57. 880 F.2d 838, 841-42 (5th Cir. 1989).
58. 672 F.2d 1255 (5th Cir. 1982).
59. 880 F.2d at 842.
60. 58 N.J. 396, 278 A.2d 193 (1971).
61. Id. at 197.
62. 672 F.2d at 1259, citing Jaeger & Branch, Inc. v. Pappas, 20 Utah 2d 100, 433
P.2d 605 (1967).
63. 880 F.2d at 842 (citing Republic of Texas); U.C.C. § 1-201(19) (1987).
64. 880 F.2d at 842.
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The court should have recognized, however, that good faith and
notice are intended to be measured by different standards. Schwegmann
Bank clearly passed the good faith test, as it was shown that the bank
was subjectively in good faith when it took the instrument. As to the
notice issue, the facts that Schwegmann Bank knew about the dealings
that gave rise to Dr. Simmons' stopping payment of the note do not
appear to rise to the level of "notice" of Dr. Simmons' defenses. The
facts that the bank was exposed to did not compel further investigation
into the underlying transaction; the actions of the bank in accepting
the note fell within commercially reasonable standards. While it seems
to have made no difference in the outcome of the case, the court may
have set erroneous precedent by applying a subjective test to the notice
issue.
The drafters of the U.C.C. had a purpose in establishing good faith
and notice as separate criteria, and it is error for the courts to ignore
clear statutory law. An objective evaluation of what a party knew or
should have known, based upon the commercial reasonableness of the
transferee's actions in light of the facts and circumstances known to
him at the time of transfer, is the extent of the requirement under the
U.C.C. An analysis such as the one undertaken by the court in Schweg-
mann does little to guide lower courts in interpreting Louisiana's com-
mercial statutes; such an analysis also fails to provide purchasers or
makers of negotiable instruments the kind of commercial predictability
necessary to assess the risk involved.
PROPER APPROACH: THE KAw VALLEY MODEL
The following section outlines the proper approach under the U.C.C.
in determining whether a party has notice of a claim or defense.
Given the advantages that holder in due course status affords, it
would be unjust to allow too lax an inquiry into what the purchaser
knew or should have known. The resolution of the problem of what
burden should be placed on a purchaser might well lie somewhere
between an easily circumvented "reasonable inference" test and the
overly demanding "duty of inquiry" standard.A
The determination of'whether or not a party has notice is necessarily
fact bound, and formulation of a bright-line test is a difficult task.
Nevertheless, a case from which a workable approach can be derived
is Kaw Valley State Bank and Trust Co. v. Riddle. 6 In this case, the
Supreme Court of Kansas, recognizing the distinctions between good
65. Supra note 34 and accompanying text.
66. 219 Kan. 550, 549 P.2d 927 (1976).
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faith and notice, stated that "reason to know" appears to be "premised
on the use of reasonable commercial practices. '67
In denying holder in due course status to the plaintiff, the Kaw
Valley court noted that the transferor of the note and the bank had
occupied a close relationship with one another not only on this trans-
action but on many other transactions. Holder in due course status was
denied not based solely on past dealings, but because the transferor had
often acted as an "agent" of Kaw Valley. The bank had knowledge of
the transferror's business practices. The bank knew that the consideration
it had paid for the notes was not, as was represented by the instrument,
already in the possession of the maker, but was to be used by the
transferror to purchase future equipment. Kaw Valley did not make
demand on the makers themselves, but delivered coupon books to the
transferror, and relied on it for collection "as if it were the obligor or
was authorized as its collection agent for this transaction. ' 68
Arguably, disqualifying a would-be holder in due course based solely
upon his knowledge of past transactions is no less than saying a holder
has a duty to inquire, which, as mentioned earlier, establishes an im-
proper standard. 69 However, the Kaw Valley court did more than simply
state there was a "duty of inquiry." The court recognized something
the U.S. Fifth Circuit in Schwegmann failed to recognize: the importance
of distinguishing good faith from notice, and of examining all facts and
circumstances known to the holder when deciding the issue of notice.
The Kaw Valley court applied a commercial reasonableness standard
when examining these facts and circumstances and in determining what
Kaw Valley knew or had reason to know of the maker's defense. This
is the optimal approach to the notice issue. It traces the requirements
discused by the U.C.C. drafters and introduces a practical test-com-
mercial reasonableness-in determining holder in due course status. The
Kaw Valley approach ensures that holder in due course status will not
be freely determined, yet offers parties to commercial transactions some
degree of predictability.
CONCLUSION
The particular facts of Kaw Valley are not important. The impor-
tance of that case lies in the approach used by the court in reaching
its decision. Adopting such an approach in Louisiana would not place
too great a burden on negotiability, and would serve to promote the
67. Id. at 933.
68. Id. at 935.
69. See W. Hawkland and L. Lawrence, supra note 25, at 421. But see Norman v.
World Wide Distributors, Inc., 202 Pa. Super. 53, 195 A.2d 115 (1963) (knowledge of
business practices may be knowledge of a claim or defense).
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end of commercial predictability. If the Schwegmann court had followed
this approach, it would have recognized that good faith and notice are
two distinct criteria that should be measured by different standards. The
court should have applied a subjective inquiry only to the requirement
of good faith, then should have gone a step further and analyzed what
the purchaser knew or should have known about possible claims and
defenses at the time of purchase. The purchaser's actual or constructive
knowledge should depend on what is reasonable under accepted com-
mercial standards. Whether the purchaser should have investigated fur-
ther would depend upon whether his actions, based on the facts known
to him, constituted a commercially reasonable activity.
When faced with these issues again, Louisiana courts would do well
to ignore the faulty analysis used by the Fifth Circuit in Schwegmann
and prior Louisiana state court decisions, and adopt the Kaw Valley
approach of distinguishing the concepts of good faith and notice.
Michael R. Ross

